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black migration to the North, which made the Demo-
cratic Party more northern and liberal, and the popula-
tion growth and migrants that augmented Republican
ranks throughout the Sunbelt. He also examines the evan-
gelical reaction and the secular response, noting that the
“contemporary relationship between church-going habits
and presidential vote actually emerged quite suddenly
between the 1988 and 1992 elections” (p. 115). In addi-
tion, both books characterize contemporary electoral cam-
paigns as primarily about mobilizing core constituencies,
rather than appealing to swing voters. They both con-
clude that gerrymandering played little role in congres-
sional polarization. Both are skeptical about any easy
reforms that would reverse these trends. And both reflect
back on the famous 1951 American Political Science Asso-
ciation report “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party
System” by warning political scientists to “be careful what
you wish for, lest it come true” (Abramowitz pp. ix–x;
see also Fiorina pp. xv–xvii, 159–160).
With both books drawing on many of the same data
sources, it is clear that the principal differences between
them are interpretive. But the disagreements are not merely
semantic or superficial. Together they provide a produc-
tive debate about contemporary political representation
in the United States. Each is provocative, engaging, easy
to read, perfectly appropriate for use in undergraduate
courses, and capable of reaching an audience beyond polit-
ical science.
Still, in reading two such books that take for granted
an extraordinary intensity of elite polarization in Ameri-
can politics, I wonder if the use of roll-call votes to mea-
sure congressional polarization has led to an exaggerated
view. Looking instead to the policies pursued by the two
parties when they are in power suggests more centrism
than extremism. Even during the years of unified Repub-
lican control under President George W. Bush, legisla-
tion on hot-button issues generally hewed close to
mainstream opinion—for example, limiting federal rec-
ognition of gay marriage but not interfering with state
policies to the contrary, and banning only some late-
term abortion procedures. When the Democrats sub-
sequently came back to power, with supermajority control
of the Senate after 2008, they did not roll back the Repub-
lican policies that they had so vigorously opposed. The
2003 Medicare prescription drug benefit, created to great
outcry among Democrats, was only marginally tweaked
during the landmark health care reform of 2010. Presi-
dent Bush’s highly contentious antiterrorism domestic sur-
veillance programs were retroactively validated by a
Democratic-controlled Congress in 2007. At this writ-
ing, a Democratic Congress is likely to extend the con-
troversial 2001 Bush tax cuts for all but the highest income
taxpayers (and it is possible that even those may be pre-
served). President Bush’s auto and banking bailouts were
continued under Obama.
Such continuities suggest that a considerable share of
the polarization in Washington voting and rhetoric may
be engineered for political communication and voter mobi-
lization. During an era of remarkably tight two-party
competition, the party out of power continually impeaches
the performance of the party in power in a bid for
increased public support. But in the end, the two parties
may not disagree nearly so profoundly as they seem to
now.
From Words to Worlds: Exploring Constitutional
Functionality. By Beau Breslin. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2008. 232p. $50.00.
doi:10.1017/S153759271000263X
— Robert L. Tsai, American University
With this concise and lively treatment of constitutions
and their functions, Beau Breslin aims to restore the role
of text to the study of democratic constitutionalism. Mar-
ginalized by scholarly attention to the actions and inter-
pretations of particular legal actors, he says, the U.S.
Constitution as a “unique composition” serving “symbolic
and practical” purposes has all too often been overlooked
(pp. 3, 5). As a corrective, Breslin trains attention on seven
functions served by a written constitution: transforming
existing orders, conveying collective aspirations, design-
ing institutions, mediating conflict, recognizing claims of
subnational communities, empowering social actors, and
constraining governmental authority. Each chapter is
devoted to explicating a different function. Throughout,
the author employs useful examples from around the world,
with Canada, Iraq, Israel, South Africa, and the United
States receiving the most attention.
Breslin’s approach makes for a learned, accessible intro-
duction to the reasons why people worldwide might turn
to written constitutionalism, even if it is not always con-
ducive to fine-grained scrutiny of any particular people’s
constitution-writing experience. The author is at his best
when he moves beyond the various attributes of constitu-
tions in the abstract and comments on global trends. In
these places, he flirts with the empirical questions of con-
stitutionalism over time: namely, how the practice has
changed, what appears to have been learned from others’
experiments, and what these lessons bode for the future of
constitutionalism. He observes that constitutions have got-
ten longer (p. 55), and that the typical preamble, such as
that of the South African Constitution, now painstak-
ingly records a country’s tragic past to be overcome instead
of remaining content with universal statements on liberty
and justice (p. 57). As constitutions have become more
codelike, they have also devoted more space to articulat-
ing individual liberties, often in advance of establishing
the structure of government (pp. 84–85).
Breslin’s account stimulates several questions: Are these
trends, accelerated by the processes of antitotalitarianism
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and decolonization, indicative of efficient writing prac-
tices or rote copying? How many are bottom-up constitu-
tions and which are top-down charters? Could we say,
with any assurance, that the ascendance of written consti-
tutionalism has produced greater freedoms as well—or is
this presumed cause-and-effect relationship between writ-
ing and liberty more imagined than proven?
Among the constitutional functions explored by Bres-
lin, two seem particularly salient in the post-Cold War
age: managing social conflict and preserving cultural her-
itage. Social movements worldwide have unleashed not
only tales of historical oppression but also urgent pleas for
legal accommodation. Breslin presents Canada as a suc-
cessful episode of writing to manage conflict and recog-
nize cultural minorities (pp. 106–110, 121–132). He
marshals polls suggesting that Canadians’ participation in
the 1982 revision of their constitution unified them around
a vision of pluralist democracy (pp. 108–109). Assuming
this to be true, is it a replicable experience, or is there
something about Canadian society or its traditions that
made this outcome uniquely plausible?
Another of Breslin’s claims worth unpacking is the
impact of international opinion favoring written consti-
tutionalism. Just as acquiring nuclear weapons once sig-
nified international stature and influence, having a
constitution to call one’s own secures a people a place
among the community of modern nations. It must be a
powerful temptation, then, to author a constitution in
order to maximize aspirational and expressive gains, even
when the gulf between text and enforcement is likely to
be significant. Along with the advent of global constitu-
tionalism, one might expect a corresponding rise in vastly
underenforced and incompletely authorized constitu-
tions. It is an empirical matter to discover the extent to
which intended functions actually are fulfilled, or whether,
instead, constitutional provisions are either ignored or
work at cross-purposes.
As Breslin notes (p. 98–99), the international expecta-
tion to have a constitution of one’s own is bucked by
Israel, whose citizens made plans to write a unitary con-
stitution in 1948 but have never completed the task.
Two reasons are frequently cited: fears that a constitution
would, first, dilute the nation’s religious distinctiveness
and, second, hamstring efforts to deal with matters of
national security. Perhaps with Canada in mind, the author
observes that authoring a Bill of Rights might “have the
effect of reaching out to minority religious and ethnic
groups who have long felt oppressed by government pol-
icies” (p. 100). Likewise, transparent ordering of state
institutions “might go a long way toward appeasing com-
munities that believe the largely unconstrained authority
of the state has contributed to ongoing violence” (p. 100).
At this point, a thicker case study of Israel, like Breslin’s
extensive treatment of Canada, might prove illuminat-
ing. What factors have enabled Israel to be perceived as a
modern constitutional democracy while simultaneously
avoiding the harshest condemnation for refusing to cod-
ify legal limits with clarity? Has the staunch support
of Western allies promoted or stunted Israel’s legal
development?
To the extent that internal practices have allowed Israel
to walk a fine line, the relatively brisk maturity of Israel’s
legal culture may have something to do with it. The Israeli
Supreme Court’s declaration of a “constitutional revolu-
tion” elevating the Basic Law to supreme normative status
suggests that juridic constitutionalism has filled the void
to repair any reputational damage caused by piecemeal
constitutionalism. Although the 1992 Basic Laws men-
tion only a slice of rights found in liberal nations, Aharon
Barak led the Israeli Supreme Court through a creative
synthesis of disparate legal texts, deeming speech and
equality—two rights not mentioned in the Basic Law—to
be nevertheless part of Israeli constitutional law’s protec-
tion of “dignity.” Still, to what extent can judge-driven
constitutionalism provide features found wanting in orig-
inal design?
This leads to a deeper question: the circumstances under
which underwritten or disaggregated constitutional sys-
tems succeed or fail. The inquiry may be understood as a
natural outgrowth of Breslin’s project, for eventually one
will want to know what metrics ought to be used to assess
the actual functionality of design choices. Theorists assume
a necessary organic connection between a citizenry and its
constitution for certain functions (e.g., aspirational,
identity-making) to be realized. Is it consent, authenticity,
inclusiveness, or procedural fairness that ought to be the
benchmark for this connection? Although he offers Joseph
Raz’s perspective that the moral legitimacy of a constitu-
tion derives from the justifications of original authors but
can change as time passes, Breslin himself does not take a
firm position as to how a constitution maintains legiti-
macy over time. Perhaps—consistent with a functional
account—certain core functions must be well served before
a constitution is declared legitimate in the eyes of the
living?
Breslin’s later discussion of England’s unwritten consti-
tutional tradition suggests that a robust legal culture is
essential to a polity that stands the test of time. Once
developed, such a culture inculcates respect for rules and
controversial outcomes, fosters lawyers and activists capa-
ble of testing written commitments, and enables jurists to
envision plausible routes when democratic majorities show
little patience for the enforcement of legal limits. The text
of a constitution may begin the task of creating such an
ethos and legalized way of life—by rhetorically empower-
ing committed citizens and talented judges and establish-
ing rule-of-law mechanisms with a shot at growing strong
and uncorrupted. But much of these social conditions
upon which success depends lie far beyond the text of a
constitution. They have to do with text, but after the
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moment of inscription they have more to do with how
others make use of the text.
Breslin’s erudite book elucidates the reasons a people
might engage in constitutional creation in the first place—
the point at which dreams are the most glorious and words
are the most inspirational. What follows can never match
a people’s sheer audacity in that moment, but with Bres-
lin’s helpful prompting, it may one day be possible to test
their leap of faith.
Democracy in the States: Experiments in Election
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Their Effects. By Michael J. Hanmer. New York: Cambridge
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— Edward M. Burmila, University of Georgia
Aldous Huxley commented that consistency “is contrary
to nature, contrary to life. The only completely consistent
people are dead.” If so, then the American electoral sys-
tem, with its local diversity in rules, practices, and politi-
cal culture, is a living, breathing, and evolving entity. One
of the distinguishing characteristics of American elections
compared to other advanced democracies is the absence of
uniform, “nationalized” elections. Instead, voting and
counting ballots are fundamentally local activities. While
localism is a boon for political scientists, given the oppor-
tunities for natural experiments it creates, allowing local
interpretations of such a basic democratic right has been
problematic historically. To what extent are local differ-
ences in procedures and practices permissible if they have
a demonstrable impact on individuals’ ability or propen-
sity to participate in elections? This question underlies
debates over election reform in the United States, and
these reforms in turn motivate and inform the three works
reviewed here.
In The Way We Vote, Alec Ewald, the author of promi-
nent research on voter registration and felony disenfran-
chisement, provides a thorough account of the origins
and history of the American tradition of decentralized
control of elections. The vagaries inherent in this highly
localized system of administration are often fodder for
critics, but Ewald takes a different approach, acknowledg-
ing the variation in the system while arguing that localism
is both intentional and beneficial. His major theoretical
contribution stems from the argument that the right to
vote is fundamentally a “practice” (p. 9) conditioned by
local institutions that administer elections. While the right
to vote is derived from the law, the local institutions that
execute the law and administer the actual process of vot-
ing are equally important components of suffrage in prac-
tice. Those local institutions vary in the United States to a
degree unique among democracies.
The bulk of Ewald’s book is devoted to a detailed account
of the origin, history, and evolution of shared local, state,
and national control of elections in the United States.
This is the strength of the book, making it of particular
interest to scholars of American political development.
The history of American suffrage shows that control of
the electoral process is decentralized by design. It reflects
both the American interpretation of democratic ideals and
practical considerations. Reaching back to colonial times,
Ewald explains how elections evolved from operations
purely under local control to the complex mix of congres-
sional mandates, court rulings, state laws, and local prac-
tices that exists today. While recognizing the value of the
element of centralized control—the Voting Rights Act,
for example, was inarguably beneficial by ensuring the
consistent application of rights—he argues that local prac-
tices are an essential component of self-rule and popular
sovereignty.
This segues into Ewald’s core account of the four ben-
efits of localism: increased efficacy and ownership of the
political process, the potential for innovation and experi-
mentation, the diffusion of power as a bulwark against the
centralized authority, and increased participation driven
by social approbation when local institutions are instru-
mental to the electoral process. Ultimately, Ewald makes a
valuable distinction between standardization and unifor-
mity as goals of election reform. He argues that reforms
are best focused on standardizing elections—ensuring trans-
parency, accuracy, fairness, participation, and equal access.
But reforms neither can nor should seek to enforce uni-
formity, defined as ensuring that all voters across the coun-
try have identical experiences on Election Day. In other
words, variable aspects of elections, such as the method of
voting, polling hours, and provision of alternative voting
methods, should remain under local control to maximize
the benefits of localism.
While The Way We Vote is primarily historical in its
analysis, Discount Voting offers the cutting edge of mixed-
methods research on the relationship between voter turn-
out and electoral rules. Michael Hanmer, whose work has
established him as a rising name in research on turnout
and voting technology, tackles a question that has plagued
scholars of American turnout for the past three decades.
If, as the existing literature argues, registration is a costly
barrier to voting, why have structural reforms that facili-
tate registration done so little to improve turnout? He
focuses on two reforms—Election Day registration (EDR)
and both state and federal “motor voter” laws that com-
bine driver services, such as renewing a license, with voter
registration.
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